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FISCAL DOMINANCE CUBE

What would it take for the Fed relax its indepenent stance in pursuit of its triple mandate and begin to consider the Treasury's needs in its decisionmaking?

The boundaries on the Fiscal Dominance Cube were chosen based on one possible answer to that question. It reckons that if:

  1. the funds rate is at or under the Treasury's book rate,
  2. and interest paid to the public is over one fifth of general-fund receipts,
  3. and the primary deficit / GDP is positive

...all at the same time, then the Fed might begin, either through voluntary cooperation or Congressional action (similar to the WWII-era legislation passed under comparable conditions), to relax its independence as a money supply manager only and consider Treasury budgetary needs in its policy decisions.

Last observation in the quarter. NIPA with NIPA, funds from FRED, book coupon from Fiscal Data. The plotted path runs from 2000-Q1 through the last quarter where those inputs all exist. That quarter-end label is not the date BEA released the print, and it is not the sustainability cube's last point. The gold diamond is a Gemini guess for the next quarter-end — not a BEA print, not a forecast you should trade. It is often wrong, and sometimes amusing. F1 uses live funds minus the last book coupon. F2/F3 NIPA is whatever Gemini returned that night. See the guess and its sources.

Next data point

Quarter on the cube: …

Release date: …

On the plot: …

Already measured for this quarter

Inside the quarter, not the quarter print

Still waiting

F2 is interest to the public over general-fund receipts: A091 / ( FGRECPT − W780 ). NIPA consolidates intra-gov interest, so A091 is already the public coupon. W780 is social-insurance contributions (cash-exhausted while OASI runs a cash deficit). No till toggle — that ratio is the cube.

01 / Distance to the Fiscal Dominance Zone over time

Straight-line distance to the magenta box, in the same units the cube is drawn in. The line rises when the quarter moves away, falls when it moves closer, is zero on the surface, and is negative inside.

Zero is the surface. The diamond is the hike quarter with the lowest distance on this line, and the dashed cube above is that same quarter. If a later hike prints lower, both move.

02 / Distance and FOMC Δ

Same distance as in 01 (negative = inside, 0 = the surface) on x; quarterly net FOMC Δ on y. Distance is the independent variable: did being inside the box change the hike / hold / cut. Missing FOMC prints are omitted, not plotted as a hold. Magenta ring = inside the box.

03 / each axis

1 · y(funds − book coupon)

Same idea as the refi gap, except the left-hand rate is FEDFUNDS rather than the CMT-weighted marginal. This plot is the cube coordinate, not the raw gap.

F1 = −(funds − book − 0) / σ   σ from 2000-Q1

Sign flipped so F1 > 0 means funds are already at or under the book — a hike is then a fiscal tightening of the stock.

2 · y(Interest / general-fund receipts)

NIPA interest to the public over general-fund current receipts. General fund = current receipts minus social-insurance contributions. Magenta wire at 0 is 20% of that till.

(A091 / (FGRECPT − W780) − 20%) / σ   σ from 2000-Q1

3 · primary / GDP

Are operations still open. Magenta wire at 0: still borrowing after interest.

100 × (FGEXPND − A091RC1Q027SBEA − FGRECPT) / GDP

primary, not the unified deficit

All four named series NIPA / BEA SAAR, same vintage as the till. Interest stripped so this axis asks “are we borrowing for operations,” not “is the till already paying the coupon.” This is the flow, not a z-score of debt held by the public / GDP. High stock with a primary surplus is a different country. Completes Δ(debt/GDP) ≈ (r − g)×stock + primary.

Updates

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